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The Danish collective bargaining system is often considered a good example of organised decentralisation. 
It has been characterised as a centralised decentralisation suggesting a reproduction of sector-level 
bargaining relations at company level. A recent survey on company-level bargaining in the Danish 
industrial sector confirms this hypothesis with regard to the experiences of local managers and shop 
stewards. However, part of the survey also questions whether the reproduction will continue in the future. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises and their employees tend to miss out on the mutual benefits obtained 
through company-level agreements. Furthermore, shop stewards often find it difficult to gain employee 
support during negotiations, which jeopardises their bargaining relations with management. 
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Introduction and background 
Decentralisation of collective bargaining has been a common trend in a number of Western economies 
over the last two or three decades. Two types of decentralisation have been identified. Organised 
decentralisation, which we find in countries where decentralisation has taken place without significant 
drops in union densities and coverage of collective agreements, and disorganised decentralisation, where 
the process of decentralisation has been accompanied by an erosion of union densities and coverage of 
collective agreements (Traxler 1995).  
Organised decentralisation has had many names. Some have used the concept of coordinated 
decentralisation, whereas others have taken up the term controlled decentralisation (Ferner and Hyman 
1992, 1998; Schulten 2005; Haipeter 2009). The Danish version of organised decentralisation is often 
referred to as centralised decentralisation (Due et al. 1994; Due and Madsen 2006). The Danish case 
offers a good example of organised decentralisation as union densities and the coverage of collective 
agreements remain comparatively high. Today, union density in Denmark is close to a level where seven in 
ten wage earners are organised, and seven in ten are covered by collective agreements (Due and Madsen 
2009).  
However, the concept of centralised decentralisation goes further than defining the delegation of 
bargaining competencies from the sector level to the company level within a context of high union 
densities and high coverage of collective agreements. Among others, the concept should also imply a 
reproduction of the bargaining power and the trust-based bargaining culture found at sector level to the 
local level, the so-called reproduction hypothesis (Due et al. 1994; Due and Madsen 2006). Therefore, 
most employees are expected to be represented by shop stewards and most company-level bargaining is 
expected to be based on trust between shop stewards and local management. It should here be noted that 
Danish shop stewards (tillidsrepræsentanter) are elected among union members at the workplace only and 
usually possess extensive bargaining competencies. 
Nevertheless, this reproduction hypothesis has never been verified or rejected by any large empirical 
study at company level. Figures are available on shop steward presence, which in the Danish context is an 
important precondition to initiate company-level bargaining (Jensen et al. 1999; Bild et al. 2007)i. But 
little is known of the effects of a reproduction of collective bargaining at company level in terms of 
bargaining activities and outcomes.  
This paper sheds light on the consequences of organised decentralisation at company level in Denmark 
by analysing data on local negotiations. Data is drawn from a large survey on company-level bargaining 
conducted among managers and shop stewards at 226 randomly selected manufacturing companies in the 
Danish industrial sector in 2008. Manufacturing is of special interest as it has the longest history of 
decentralisation within the Danish collective bargaining system dating back to the introduction of local 
level wage setting in the beginning of the 20th century and still remains the trend setting sector with regards 
to decentralisation (Due et al.1994; Jensen 2007). Already in 1902 pay became a matter of company-level 
bargaining within the metal industry in Denmark, and over the past century this tradition of local wage 
setting spread to the rest of the Danish industrial sector. At present, only minimum wage levels (which 
make up approximately half of the wages paid) are negotiated at sector level, whereas the actual wage 
increases are concluded between local bargaining parties. During the 1990s possibilities for company-level 
bargaining in industry were expanded to the area of working hours, and from 2000, a radical opening 
clause has allowed managers and shop stewards to deviate from four chapters of the sector level agreement 
(including the chapters on working hours and further training) provided there is local consent (Navrbjerg et 
al. 2001). Since 2004 local bargaining parties have been able to make use of this option without control 
from the sector-level parties, who only need to be informed about bargaining outcomes. However, it is 
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important to underline that this decentralisation process from the very beginning took place within the 
framework of the general sector-level agreement, which secures each local bargaining party the right to 
terminate any local agreement in two months notice and fall back on the regulations of the sector-level 
agreement (Industrial Agreement 2007: Chapter 2, § 8). This de facto right of veto has been an important 
precondition for unions when accepting such strong delegation of bargaining competencies from the sector 
level to the company level.  
To analyse the impact of decentralisation on local bargaining activities and outcomes other analytical 
tools than the concepts of organised or centralised decentralisation are required, as they do not address 
these consequences. Here, the paper draws on the theory of collective bargaining developed by Walton and 
McKersie through in-depth studies at company level in the US (1965). We will especially make use of two 
of their concepts in the analysis. Firstly, the concept of integrative bargaining which refers to local 
negotiations that are to the advantage of both sides of industry; and secondly, the concept of intra-
organisational bargaining which refers to the sub-process of coordinating bargaining objectives on each 
side of industry (i.e. among the employees or among the managers) and the challenges of this process. 
The analysis of data falls in two steps. Firstly, the extent to which shop stewards are present at company 
level and to what extent local level bargaining relations are characterised by trust will be examined. This 
part of the analysis aims to test the so-called reproduction hypothesis. Secondly, the effects of shop 
steward presence and trust-based bargaining relations on bargaining activities and their outcomes will be 
analysed using the concepts of integrative and intra-organisational bargaining. 
The paper is structured in the following way: Following this section, the second gives a brief 
introduction to the concept of integrative bargaining. The third section introduces the concept of intra-
organisational bargaining. The methodology of the survey is described in section four. The results of the 
survey are then presented and analysed in section five and a discussion of the findings will follow in the 
concluding section. 
Integrative bargaining at company level 
The distinction between integrative and distributive bargaining goes back to Richard E. Walton and Robert 
B. McKersie’s famous work A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (1965)ii. They use these concepts 
to differentiate between plussum games (win-win situations) and zerosum games (win-lose situations) in 
collective bargaining at company level. Although inspired by rational choice and game theory, including 
the classic example of the prisoner’s dilemma, their starting point is closer to rational choice 
institutionalism or actor centered institutionalism rather than pure rational choice (Scharpf 1997: 36, 116; 
Campbell 2004: 10). In their world, employers make strategic choices or initiate strategic negotiations to 
which unions respond (Kochan et al. 1984; Walton et al. 1994). By talking about strategic choices they 
underline that there is always a certain scope of choice within any industrial relations system, but they also 
reflect that only a limited number of choices are strategically feasible due to different contexts such as 
sectors, markets and bargaining cultures. For instance, in companies characterised by integrative 
bargaining, the strategic choice of management will often be to negotiate bargaining outcomes that are an 
advantage to both sides of industry, as this will help preserve the trust-based bargaining relations and be an 
investment in future bargaining outcomes. By contrast, in companies characterised by distributive 
bargaining, the strategic choice of management will typically be to secure a maximum gain for the 
company here and now as there often is less trust to preserve.  
Although the concepts of integrative and distributive bargaining hypothesise a correspondence between 
the bargaining culture (the level of trust between the bargaining parties) and the bargaining outcome (win-
win or win-lose), they also underline that there is no automatic connection between trust-based bargaining 
relations and win-win bargaining outcomes. New strategic choices can change one or both of these 
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dimensions and the interaction between them. As mentioned earlier, little is known whether there is such 
correspondence between bargaining cultures and bargaining activities and outcomes at company level in 
the Danish industrial sector. This goes both for the depth of collective bargaining, i.e. the active 
participation by shop stewards in negotiating and implementing collective agreements, as well as the scope 
of collective bargaining, i.e. whether managers and shop stewards conclude a number of different types of 
agreements (Clegg 1976: 8-9).  
Nevertheless, both the depth and scope of company-level bargaining not only depends on the level of 
trust between the local bargaining parties but also on the level of resources available for bargaining 
activities. Studies have shown that one in two Danish shop stewards do not have enough time for 
representative work, and that on average only one in ten shop stewards has agreed with management that a 
number of their weekly working hours are reserved for representative work (Jensen et al. 1999: 69-70, 
136). This suggests that many shop stewards have limited time for negotiations with management, 
including preparation and implementation processes. 
Intra-organisational bargaining and local asymmetries of power 
When the right to conclude agreements is delegated from the sector level to the company level as part of a 
decentralisation process, this means that collective bargaining can take place within a context of a larger 
asymmetry of power than before. From a company level perspective, a fundamental asymmetry of power 
between employers and employees can be observed due to management’s ownership and the managerial 
prerogative. This is why employees have an interest in joining unions that can conclude agreements on 
their behalf. Employers (to varying degrees) also have an interest in joining employers’ organisations and 
participate in multi-employer bargaining, as this can increase their control over wages and give access to 
no-strike agreements (Clegg 1976: 5; Sisson 1987: 11-13, 191; Due and Madsen 1996: 834f). The institu-
tionalisation of a collective bargaining system with multi-employer bargaining supplies the employees 
with an equal bargaining power as the employers. However, to obtain this power balance at sector level 
employees have to sacrifice some power at company level. Among others the no-strike agreements limit 
their opportunity to oppose managerial dispositions between negotiations of the sector-level agreements. 
Furthermore, management possesses a right to hire and fire, which cannot be questioned by the shop 
stewards except in a few exceptional cases. This is why a number of rules in the sector-level agreement for 
the Danish industrial sector protect shop stewards against being fired. 
However, these are not the only significant asymmetries of power at company level. The character of 
the bargaining process on the side of the employees can have crucial implications for the bargaining power 
of the shop stewards during negotiations with management.  
Managers and shop stewards are, like negotiators at sector/national level, to be considered collective 
actors, who make collective choices in close interaction with the members of the organisations they 
represent (Walton and McKersie 1965: 3, 281f; Rubin and Brown 1975: 43). During negotiations, the 
bargaining parties not only have to come to agreement with each other but also with those they represent. 
Walton and McKersie characterises this sub process as intra-organisational bargaining (Walton and 
McKersie 1965: 281). The challenge of this process is that we often find a lack of internal consensus 
within organisations. Each negotiator represents an organisation with members of different needs, interests 
and preferences. Reaching consensus among a majority of these members is an important part of the job 
when concluding collective agreements. However, when we look at the company level, this process is 
often more demanding for unions than for management. A chief negotiator on the union side will often 
represent more than one union, whereas a chief negotiator on the management side (unless we talk about 
very large enterprises) typically only represents one company. This is especially true for the Danish 
industrial sector, where there are numerous unions, whilst the number of very large companies is limited. 
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Intra-organisational bargaining is therefore potentially more challenging for shop stewards than for 
managers within this sector. 
Rubin and Brown have underlined that chief negotiators in all types of bargaining depend on support 
from their constituencies to establish accountable negotiating mandates (Rubin and Brown 1975: 43). In 
the process of achieving consensus among the constituencies the chief negotiators face the potential 
problems of role conflicts as it can be difficult to meet and combine the expectations directed to them. 
Within the field of collective bargaining chief negotiators are challenged by the fact that employees (and in 
some cases managers) might stop supporting their negotiators if bargaining outcomes are non-satisfactory. 
Walton and McKersie identify two types of role conflicts in relation to this challenge. The first type is 
boundary conflicts, which arise when it is difficult, if not impossible, for a negotiator to achieve consensus 
within his/her organisation that corresponds with what can be concluded at the bargaining table (Walton 
and McKersie 1965: 283f). This type of conflict reflects that chief negotiators essentially have to manage a 
position, where two different sets of expectations are to be joined. The situation resembles what Robert 
Putnam has characterised as a two-level game (Putnam 1988: 433). Negotiators not only have to aim for 
results that his/her counterpart can accept. They also have to reach an agreement that is acceptable to 
his/her constituencies.  
The second type of conflicts is factional conflicts or so-called internal conflicts, as they relate to the 
chief negotiators own organisations (Walton and McKersie 1965: 288-289). They can develop completely 
apart from the position of the opponent; but, do not necessarily have to do so. The most serious internal 
conflicts are caused by disagreements over the purpose of the negotiations. These conflicts can be related 
to either vertical differentiation or horizontal differentiation within organisations (ibid. 289-293). Vertical 
differences relate to the fact that managers as well as employees usually work in hierarchies that can be 
more or less explicit and formal. Varying positions in these hierarchies are related to different interests and 
preferences. Chief negotiators on either side might therefore think differently than their constituents on the 
shop floor. Horizontal differences relate to heterogeneities between different groups of managers or 
different groups of workers. The horizontal distances are greatest where the bargaining team represents 
different entities on either one or both sides of industry. This is, for instance, the case if the bargaining 
team includes more than one union or, in the case of large enterprises, more than one company (ibid. 291).   
A key instrument for chief negotiators in minimizing such uncertainties is the formation of coalitions 
(Rubin and Brown 1975: 64f). This is also an attractive solution to unions and/or companies. If they join 
forces at least for short periods of time, they can to varying degrees ensure that their particular interests are 
brought to the negotiating table. However, even when coalitions are established, it remains a major 
challenge for the chief negotiators to manage and interpret them. In-depth case studies of sector-level 
bargaining in the Danish public sector suggest, that conflicts of interest inside coalitions can have larger 
impacts on final bargaining outcomes than conflicts of interest across the bargaining table (Due and 
Madsen 1996: 972f). We shall, throughout the paper, refer to this as the coalition problem. However, little 
is known about the distribution of coalition problems at company level in both Danish and international 
contexts. Most of the recent studies on company-level bargaining have been concerned with analysing 
bargaining outcomes and/or the bargaining culture between the two sides of industry (Walton et al. 1994; 
Seifert and Massa-Wirth 2005; Haipeter and Lehndorff 2005; Haipeter 2009). Other studies have mainly 
focused on the presence of works councils and their effects, as union densities and the coverage of works 
councils have been declining in many countries (Rogers and Streek 1995; Frege 2002; Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman 2006; Charlwood and Terry 2007; Heywood and Jirjahn 2009; Nergaard et al. 
2009; Rigby et al. 2009). Nevertheless, considering Walton and McKersie’s work on intra-organisational 
bargaining, it seems likely that coalition problems also play a significant role in company-level bargaining, 
especially on the union side. 
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Even when the bargaining team includes only one company and only one union, there are, however, still 
important horizontal distances that can give rise to internal conflicts, especially among employees. 
Diversity of interests can also be identified within each union (or company), as members of the same 
organisation can have different preferences. On the employee side, variations in demographics such as 
education, skills, sex, age, seniority and family status influence employees’ preferences for different 
agreements and arrangements. On the management side interests can vary between line and staff personnel 
(Walton and McKersie 1965: 291-292). For instance, Danish case studies have revealed that company-
level agreements on flexible working hours can benefit some workers,  whilst other workers in the same 
company covered by the same agreement acquire no benefit at all (Navrbjerg 1999: 59f). Depending on 
demographics, some employees can be potential winners and others potential losers of a company-level 
agreement. This means that their attitude towards an agreement can differ tremendously. Generally 
speaking, the question is, whether a shop steward from a specific union represents all his/her members at 
the workplace during negotiations. We will refer to this problem as the representation problem. 
After this introduction and discussion of the main concepts to be used in the analysis, we will now turn 
to a presentation of how data was collected, i.e. the methods of the survey, and the strategy of analysis. 
Methods and data 
The analysis draws on the results from a comprehensive web-based survey conducted among managers 
and shop stewards at manufacturing companies in the Danish industrial sector in January 2008. Companies 
were selected randomly from a complete list of manufacturing companies covered by the sector-level 
agreement and with 20 or more employees supplied by The Confederation of Danish Industry (DI), the 
employers’ organisation in the Danish industrial sector. As shop steward presence is an important 
precondition to conclude agreements at company level, it was necessary to identify the companies with one 
or more shop stewards present. This step included a supplementary phone survey of 546 companies, which 
also enabled us to identify the manager and the shop steward negotiating agreements for the largest group 
of employees in the production (i.e. the chief negotiators), and to which we wanted to direct the survey. 
Two separate versions of the questionnaire were developed, one for the managers and one for the shop 
stewards. However, to allow a comparison of their answers, as many questions as possible were kept 
identical. The design of the questionnaires was informed by five case studies in the Danish industrial sector 
performed in 2005 and was tested in a pilot survey at a large and a small company before use. The 
questionnaires included questions on 1) existing agreements on pay, working hours and further training, 2) 
why collective bargaining had been initiated and by whom, 3) the level of trust towards the immediate 
bargaining party, 4) difficulties during negotiations and 5) effects of the agreements. Certain background 
questions on company characteristics (size, ownership etc.) and on the characteristics of managers and 
shop stewards (age, tenure, title) were also included.  
 A total of 145 managers and 151 shop stewards from 226 different companies with shop steward 
presence completed the questionnaire (which was sent to 369 managers and 288 shop stewards, 
respectively). The response rate was somewhat lower on the management side (39.3 percent) than on the 
employee side (52.4 percent). We therefore analysed the sample to see if there were any significant 
differences in the composition of the non-responding group and the responding group with regards to sex, 
company size or geography. Fortunately, we did not find any statistically significant differences to indicate 
that respondents were not in general representative and raise questions as to the reliability of the sample. 
This was also true for the shop stewards. Apart from examining all frequency tables, data was analysed 
using two strategies; 1) A comparison of answers from managers and shop stewards where relevant. 2) A 
multiple correspondence analysis of the distribution of different forms agreements across companies. The 
first general analysis of the survey results showed that managers and shop stewards often gave relatively 
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similar answers to the same questions. Both managers and shop stewards participating in the survey had 
been actively involved in company-level bargaining for an average of eight years. Therefore they often had 
a solid experience on the subjects we were asking about. 
 
Results  
Testing the reproduction hypothesis – shop steward presence and trust-based 
bargaining relations 
77 percent of the companies participating in the phone survey reported one or more shop stewards present, 
which confirms the hypothesis that the bargaining power of the sector level parties is reproduced at 
company level in the Danish industrial sector. However, the distribution of shop stewards varied 
significantly among larger and smaller companies. 93 percent among the large companies reported shop 
stewards present, whereas 60 percent of the small companies did the same (see Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1: Shop stewards vs. company size (percent). 
 
One or more shop 
stewards No shop stewards 
Small (20-49 employees) 60     40    
Medium-sized (50-99 employees)  80       20    
Large (100- employees) 93     7      
γ = 0.641, p=0.000 
 
 
It is the distribution among the small companies that attracts most interest in a comparative context. It is 
not unusual to find many employee representatives in larger companies in other countries. This is, for 
instance, the case with regards to German works councils (Betriebsräte), although their bargaining 
competencies are significantly less compared to Danish shop stewards. However, it is rare to find 60 
percent coverage among small companies. In Germany, less than 3 percent of small companies have a 
works council, although both German works councils and Danish shop stewards can be elected in 
companies with five employees or more (Stettes 2007)iii. Furthermore, recent surveys from the UK show 
that only 13 percent of all British workplaces with 10 or more employees have on-site representatives of 
recognised unions. These workplaces employ 39 percent of all employees indicating that coverage in the 
UK is primarily found among the largest of companies (Kersley et al. 2005: 13-14). The coverage of shop 
stewards found among small companies in this study seems to be comparatively high and to enable a 
comparison of company-level bargaining across smaller and larger companies, which can be difficult in 
other cases.  
The survey also revealed that most managers and shop stewards expressed high levels of trust towards 
their immediate bargaining party. More precisely, three out of four managers and shop stewards reported 
high or very high levels of trust (see Table 2). This result was independent of company size. Less than 10 
percent reported low levels of trust. In general, bargaining cultures in the majority of companies can 
therefore be characterised as based on trust. Indeed this supports the second half of the hypothesis that the 
bargaining power and the bargaining culture of the sector level are reproduced at company level in the 
Danish collective bargaining system. It is difficult to estimate whether this bargaining culture resembles 
the situation in other countries or not. We do have access to surveys on trust between local bargaining 
parties from the UK and Germany (Kersley et al. 2005; Nienhüser and Hossfeld 2010). However, the 
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phrasing of the questions on trust as well as the analysis of trust levels (index variables vs. single variables) 
differs too much to allow for a direct comparison.   
 
 
Table 2: Level of trust between local bargaining parties (percent) 
 
Managers Shop stewards 
Very high  23 16 
High 56 59 
Medium 18 17 
Low 3 3 
Very low 0 5 
 
To which extent do we find integrative bargaining at company level? – depth, scope 
and effects 
It is one thing to have a shop steward; another to exploit this bargaining power and initiate bargaining 
activities at company level. An important question was therefore whether collective agreements had been 
concluded at the sampled companies. The survey displayed a very high bargaining activity among 
managers and shop stewards. In fact, 97 percent of the managers and 98 percent of the shop stewards had 
concluded one or more collective agreements, indicating a great depth in collective bargaining within the 
Danish industrial sector. Two out of three companies had concluded agreements on both pay and working 
hours. One in seven companies (especially the larger ones) had concluded agreements on pay, working 
hours and further training. However, there were no signs that this extensive bargaining activity at local 
level implied a decoupling from the organisations. Nine out of ten managers reported making use of their 
employers’ organisation and nine out of ten shop stewards reported establishing contact with their local 
union office during negotiations.  
Whereas similar depth was found, the scope of collective bargaining would vary from company to 
company. A couple of the participating companies had negotiated up to 15 different forms of agreements, 
whilst others had negotiated only one or two types of agreements. It is worth noting that these figures are 
to be considered minimum figures, as they only count the number of different forms of agreements. More 
than one agreement can be concluded on the same topic at the same company, and the variation in the 
number of agreements might therefore be even larger than reflected in the survey.  
Furthermore, some types of agreements were more popular than others. The most common agreement 
concerned annual wage increases, which was found in three out of four companies (see Table 3). 
Agreements on individual supplements were found in nearly one out of two companies, making this type 
of agreement the second most popular. These findings were somewhat unsurprising as they confirm the 
long tradition of decentralised wage setting in the Danish industrial sector. Agreements on team bonus and 
fringe benefits were found in three out of ten companies respectively, whereas agreements on piece work 
were found in less than 10 percent of the companies. 
With regards to working hours, the two most common agreements were agreements on flexitime and 
agreements on shift work, which were found in approximately one in two companies and one in three 
companies, respectively (see Table 3). The distribution of flexitime agreements was somewhat surprising 
compared to the distribution of agreements on annualised hours, which were only found in approximately 
one fifth of companies. This suggests that managers and shop stewards prefer agreements on flexitime 
(which typically include an increase in employees’ control of their own working hours) to agreements on 
annualised hours (where managerial control of working hours often plays a larger role). Further, an 
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interesting development can be found with regards to new forms of shift work. Agreements on traditional 
shift work are now increasingly supplemented (or maybe replaced) by agreements on staggered hours, 
compressed work weeks and 12-hour shifts. Case studies have shown that the latter two can be attractive 
alternatives for some groups of workers who prefer more days off in a row for hobbies, summer house 
visits etc. (Ilsøe 2006). Increased weekly hours are only found in one out of ten companies. 
 
 
Table 3: The distribution of different types of company-level agreements 
(percent of companies*). 
Annual wage increases 77 
Individual supplements 43 
Flexitime 43 
Shift work 35 
Team bonus 29 
Staggered hours 28 
Fringe benefits 27 
Saturday/Sunday work 26 
Annualised hours 22 
Compressed work weeks 19 
12-hour shifts 18 
Further training 14 
Part time  11 
Phased retirement 10 
Increased weekly hours 10 
Framework agreement (individual bargaining of working 
hours) 
8 
Supplementary pension contributions 7 
Piece work 6 
*Analysis based on answers from managers 
 
 
The distribution of the different types of company-level agreements in the Danish industrial sector shows 
that to a large extent employees are using the bargaining power of having a shop steward present. Also, 
they use it to negotiate agreements that include improvements of their pay and working conditions like 
flexitime, fringe benefits or further training. The content of the agreements concluded is broad and does 
not only reflect employer wishes but also those of the employees. Further, eight in ten managers and eight 
in ten shop stewards reported one or more positive effects of their agreements in the survey, whereas less 
than one in two managers and shop stewards experienced any negative effects. Positive effects included 
employer-oriented effects like increased motivation among workers, higher productivity and easier 
recruitment as well as employee-oriented effects like a better work-life balance, improved social inclusion 
and more training activities. In general, the agreements seem to benefit both sides of industry indicating 
that most company-level agreements reflect a situation of integrative bargaining. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the number of issues included in company-level bargaining tended to 
vary between companies. This variation was mainly to explain by company size. One in two large 
companies had concluded six or more agreements, whereas this was only the case for one in five among 
the SMEsiv. Further, certain forms of agreements like agreements on further training were more frequently 
found in larger companies than in smaller companies. These differences might reflect a larger need to 
formalise local arrangements and activities in large companies with many employees. However, it could 
also be down to the fact that more resources for negotiations are present on both sides of industry in large 
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companies. Data from the survey showed that managers in large enterprises were typically backed up by 
HRM divisions, whereas this was not the case for managers in SMEs. Further, shop stewards in large 
enterprises were, according to the survey results, often allowed to devote all their working time to 
collective bargaining and related activities, while their colleagues in SMEs had to do this work in their 
spare time.  
Nevertheless, company size did not turn out to be the only important variable when it came to the 
distribution of agreements across companies. Certain types of agreements also seemed to depend on the 
level of trust between the two local bargaining parties. Especially agreements on flexitime, fringe benefits 
and further training, which are typically attractive among employees, were primarily signed in companies 
with very high levels of trust. According to the survey results, these issues also shared the common trend 
that often it would be the shop stewards, not the managers, who initiated negotiations on them. However, 
the interest of employees did not seem to be a sufficient precondition for shop stewards to initiate 
collective bargaining. High levels of trust between the local level bargaining parties also needed to be 
established. Perhaps, not only shop stewards need to trust managers before taking bargaining initiatives but 
also managers need to trust the shop stewards before accepting bargaining initiatives from the other side of 
the table.  
The differences in the distribution of agreements across company size and across different levels of trust 
are illustrated by the map of agreements below (see Figure 1). The map reflects a Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis (MCA) of the presence of different forms of company-level agreements based on answers from 
the shop stewards. It is created of binary variables on whether an agreement is found or not. Full dots 
represent the presence of agreements whereas empty dots represent the absence of agreements. Company 
size and the level of trust between the local level bargaining parties are applied as supplementary variables. 
The map illustrates how company size affects the number of agreements (Axis 1). The presence of all 
types of agreements (except for piece work agreements) is found to the right side of the map and is, 
thereby, associated with large company size. This means that large companies conclude more agreements 
than SMEs. However, some types of agreements are facilitated by another factor as well, the level of trust 
between the local bargaining parties (Axis 2). The presence of agreements like flexitime, fringe benefits 
and further training is located in the upper right side of the map, which means that these agreements are 
not only associated with large company size but also very high levels of trust between the local bargaining 
parties. Although company size explains most of the variation in the distribution of agreements (82 
percent) and trust only delivers a minor contribution (8 percent), the presence of these types of agreements 
cannot be explained by company size alone. Agreements found in the lower right side of the map like 12-
hour shifts, compressed work weeks and staggered hours are associated with large company size and lower 










Difficulties in the negotiation process and problems of intra-organisational bargaining 
Behind the figures of high-trust bargaining relations, high bargaining activity and win-win bargaining 
outcomes, the survey documented another important variation when negotiating company-level 
agreements. Analysing the answers on the proceedings of the bargaining process, a number of agreements 
came out as more difficult to conclude than others. The top five of the most difficult negotiations both 
included agreements that were unpopular among employees such as increased weekly hours and 
agreements that most employees want like flexitime (see Table 4). The experience of difficulties in the 
negotiating process did therefore not reflect the popularity of the agreements among employees. This was 
true according to both managers and shop stewards. 
Instead, a close correspondence appeared to exist between the difficulties in the negotiating process and 
the difficulties on the side of the shop stewards in terms of gaining support from colleagues (see Table 5). 
This part of the negotiating process, which can also be characterised as intra-organisational bargaining, 
imposed an often larger challenge for shop stewards than managers. Managers almost always reported full 
support from other managers during negotiations. This could be explained by the fact that many of them 
worked as CEOs or as production managers, and therefore were negotiating from the very top of the 
managerial hierarchy of their company. Another reason could be that shop stewards had to deal with 
internal conflicts among employees to a larger extent than managers.  
 
 
Table 4: Has it been difficult to reach agreement with management during the negotiations? (percent of 
shop stewards*). 
 Yes No Don’t know 
Individual supplements 42 43 15 
Increased weekly hours 33 67 0 
Team bonus 32 64 4 
Annualised hours 26 74 0 
Flexitime 20 67 13 
* Shop stewards who have concluded the agreement in question 
 
 
Table 5: Has it been difficult to get support from the employees during the negotiations? (percent of shop 
stewards*). 
 Yes No Don’t know 
Increased weekly hours 53 47 0 
Annualised hours 42 58 0 
Individual supplements 40 42 18 
Flexitime 21 69 10 
Team bonus 20 73 7 
*Shop stewards who have concluded the agreement in question 
 
 
Although managers and shop stewards primarily reported positive effects of their agreements, a few 
negative effects also came to light. One of them was an increased number of conflicts at the workplace. 
Especially, two types of agreements were shown to increase the number of conflicts; agreements on 
flexitime and agreements on individual supplements.  
Agreements on flexitime are popular among many employees, as they typically offer them greater 
autonomy and control of their own working hours and thereby potentially contribute to a better work-life 
balance. However, one in five shop stewards found it difficult to gain support from the employees during 
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their negotiations on flexitime. The same figure found it difficult to reach agreement with management on 
flexitime (see Table 4 and 5). Furthermore, shop stewards with agreements on flexitime would twice as 
often report more workplace conflicts as shop stewards with other types of agreements on working time. 
This figure might even be higher, as the data only reflects conflicts in relation to concluded agreements 
and not in relation to negotiations that never materialised in an agreement.  
It seems to be a paradox that agreements on flexitime cause so much trouble for the shop stewards, 
when most employees seem to have an interest in them. Fortunately, some managers and some shop 
stewards provided written comments in the survey that could help explain this finding. More than one of 
them reported jealousy among the employees as a consequence of the negotiations on flexitime. This 
‘flexitime jealousy’ arose from the fact that due to technological or organisational reasons not all 
employees were covered by the flexitime agreement, and those who were not covered envied those who 
were. It is therefore easy to understand why some shop stewards found it difficult to gain support from the 
employees during the negotiations. They had to coordinate interests among a group of employees who 
would gain access to a highly requested benefit and a group of employees who would not gain access. 
These findings indicate that it is also possible to identify a coalition problem at company level on the side 
of the shop stewards.  
Also negotiations on individual supplements turned out to be problematic for the shop stewards. Nearly 
one in two shop stewards with agreements on individual supplements reported difficulties when trying to 
gain employees’ support during negotiations. An equal number found that negotiations with management 
had been difficult (see Table 4 and 5). Furthermore, the data revealed that agreements on individual 
supplements increased the risk of workplace conflicts by a factor of three compared to other types of 
agreements on pay. Negotiations on individual supplements appeared therefore to cause shop stewards 
even more trouble than negotiations on flexitime. Comments by managers and shop stewards suggest, 
however, that conflicts on individual supplements were due to slightly different reasons than conflicts on 
flexitime. The general idea behind individual supplements is to reward certain employees for their 
qualifications and/or performance to motivate all workers for improving their work. However, both 
managers and shop stewards stated that many employees quite often opposed the way these supplements 
were distributed. In fact, data from the survey showed that agreements on individual supplements tripled 
the risk of lower motivation among workers compared to other agreements on pay. In conclusion it must 
be said that internal conflicts over individual supplements do not seem to be caused by the question of 
whether or not workers are covered by the agreements. They are more likely caused by the fact that some 
workers do not feel adequately represented in the way the agreements are implemented. This means that 
the shop stewards are faced with a representation problem. 
  
Conclusion  
The empirical findings presented confirm the hypothesis of a reproduction of sector-level bargaining 
relations at company level in the Danish collective bargaining system. However, the findings also question 
whether this process will continue in the future.  
Shop stewards are highly prevalent and the relationship between the local bargaining parties is 
characterised by trust in most companies. Therefore the bargaining power and the bargaining culture at 
company level resemble the situation at sector level. Also, these local bargaining relations seem to 
facilitate bargaining activities, as almost all companies, including SMEs, have concluded one or more 
agreements. Company-level bargaining covers both employee-oriented and employer-oriented topics, and 
the vast majority of managers and shop stewards reported positive effects of their agreements. Most 
agreements therefore appear to reflect a process of integrative bargaining. However, although we find a 
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similar depth of collective bargaining, the scope of company-level bargaining seems to vary. Larger 
companies as well as companies with very high levels of trust between the local bargaining parties were 
more likely to conclude agreements within a wider range of areas than others. This differentiation on 
company size most likely reflects different needs of formalising local arrangements; however, it may also 
reflect different resources for collective bargaining. Furthermore, the shop stewards in particular are faced 
by significant challenges of intra-organisational bargaining, when bargaining activity increases at 
company level.  
Two different challenges or problems can be identified on the side of the shop stewards. Firstly, when 
the number of collective agreements at a single company increases, this is often followed by more 
differentiated working conditions at the company and thereby more complex tasks for the shop stewards. 
They have to create consensus among at least a majority of employees in spite of increasingly different pay 
levels and working hours and therefore increasingly different interests. Shop stewards are therefore 
challenged by coalition problems that resemble the problems unions are facing when forming coalitions 
during sector-level bargaining.  
Secondly, minorities of employees can be squeezed in the process of concluding or implementing 
agreements if their demographics deviate from the majority resulting in an increased number of internal 
conflicts among the employees which need to be mediated and solved. Generally speaking, the increased 
bargaining activity at company level thus questions whether shop stewards represent all employees 
covered by company-level agreements. In this way collective bargaining can contribute to representation 
problems at company level. 
 Both challenges underline the importance of handling diversity among employees when negotiating and 
implementing collective agreements. The capability of shop stewards to do this seems to be an important 
precondition for a continuous reproduction of trust-based bargaining relations at company level. It remains 
an open question whether shop stewards have the same opportunities for handling diversity in smaller 
companies, where resources for bargaining activities are few, compared to larger companies where greater 





Internal conflicts: only a challenge to shop stewards? 
Tensions between solidarity and diversity at the workplace are not new, but they have been intensified over 
the last decades due to changing demographics and new work organisations (Lysgaard 1961; Greene et al. 
2005; Greene and Kilton 2006). The results of the survey suggest that decentralisation of collective 
bargaining has contributed to this intensification. However, the survey also indicates that this development 
is first and foremost a challenge to shop stewards who are faced with the task of mediating disagreements 
in an increasingly diversified workforce. Managers seem to experience less trouble as they often negotiate 
from the very top of the managerial hierarchy. Other studies have found a similar pattern. Workplace 
conflicts are often directed at shop stewards. In many cases this makes good sense, since shop stewards can 
be very successful in solving conflicts (Croucher and Singe 2004; Antcliff and Saundry 2009). 
Nevertheless, internal conflicts among employees might question the negotiating mandate of the shop 
steward and have negative implications for the bargaining process between managers and shop stewards 
and their trust-based bargaining relations. In other words, internal conflicts can be followed by what 
Walton and McKersie have characterised as boundary conflicts. If management cannot trust the shop 
stewards to represent the majority of employees and guarantee an implementation of agreements in 
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practice, they will be more reluctant to conclude agreements. In this way, internal conflicts can also be a 
barrier for the participation of managers in negotiation processes.   
 
Internal conflicts in less organised settings 
Internal conflicts form an important challenge for shop stewards in Danish industry, as the collective 
bargaining system is heavily decentralised, and local bargaining activity is high. It can, however, be an 
even more crucial challenge for shop stewards/employee representatives in less organised sectors, as their 
mandate in company-level bargaining and among employees is likely to be more fragile. The survey 
presented in this article reflects the situation in one of the best organised sectors on the private labour 
market in Denmark, and challenges are therefore probably larger in other sectors. Additionally, even 
though the sample presents a random selection of companies meeting the selection criteria, the limited size 
(151 shop stewards and 145 managers) calls for some caution when generalising results to the rest of the 
Danish labour market.  
Challenges of internal conflicts might also be more demanding in less organised countries. In Germany, 
for instance, union densities have been dropping to less than 20 percent over the last decades, and works 
councils (Betriebsräte) are only present at 11 percent of companies with five employees or more (Stettes 
2007). These works councils are furthermore challenged by the fact that they are operating in a dual-
channel system of representation. The German system of works councils is – unlike the Danish system of 
shop stewards - a statutorily determined local representation system. Works councils are elected by, and 
from, the employees and are formally separated from the trade unions (Müller-Jentsch 2003). When 
collective bargaining is decentralised it therefore means that bargaining competencies move from one 
system of representation to another. German unions have been reluctant to accept a delegation of 
bargaining competencies from the sector level to the local level, and they find it difficult to deliver the 
support needed by works councils due to declining membership and resources (ibid.). Many works 
councils are therefore critical towards the process of decentralisation. In a survey among members of 
German works councils at workplaces with 20 employees or more, eight in ten reported that 
decentralisation has strengthened the position of the employers to assert their interest (Dribbusch 2005). 
This indicates that works councils might not experience a bargaining power similar to that of the 
management. Furthermore, in line with the empirical findings of this paper, three in four of the works 
councils asked reported that decentralisation leads to a differentiation of working conditions among 
employees covered by the same collective agreement (ibid.). If this means that members of German works 
councils experience some of the same challenges of intra-organisational bargaining as Danish shop 
stewards this can destabilise an already vulnerable bargaining position further. 
 
The importance of high union densities and presence of shop stewards 
The comparison with Germany underlines the importance of both high union densities and a high 
prevalence of shop stewards in the Danish case. Although Danish shop stewards are faced with significant 
challenges in relation to their colleagues, decentralisation of bargaining competencies does not seem to 
make employers gain influence at the cost of the employees and their representatives. The presence of shop 
stewards forms a local power base for unions that make them feel confident in accepting extensive 
delegation of bargaining competencies to the company level. Furthermore, decentralisation still takes place 
within the framework of sector-level agreements that allow either local party, managers or shop stewards, 
to terminate any company level agreements with a two months notice. This means that Danish shop 
stewards have a de facto right of veto that gives them a breaking mechanism in relation to local employers.  
 The Danish case shows how a high prevalence of shop stewards with a right to veto agreements can 
support the development of trust-based bargaining relations at company level. One might have expected 
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that the number of ‘wildcat’ strikes in Danish manufacturing would have increased as a consequence of 
decentralisation of collective bargaining within the framework of a no-strike agreement at sector level. 
However, the contrary has been the case. Both the number of strikes and ‘wildcat’ strikes in the industrial 
sector has decreased since the early 1990s, where the possibilities for local-level bargaining at local level 
started to expand (DA 2009). It has been argued that the extensive decentralisation in Danish 
manufacturing accounts for the larger number of wildcat strikes than in for instance Swedish and 
Norwegian manufacturing, where the decentralisation process has been less radical (Stokke and Thornqvist 
2001; Stokke 2008). The results of this survey indicate that there is no such automatic relation between 
decentralisation and wildcat strikes. Danish shop stewards seem to form an important local power base for 
employees and their unions that allow trust-based bargaining relations to develop in line with 
decentralisation and actually make wildcat strikes less necessary.  
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 Some sector-level agreements in Denmark allow alternative versions of company-level bargaining to collective 
bargaining between managers and shop stewards. However, even within these sectors, shop steward presence  
remains the most important precondition to conclude company-level agreements in practice. 
ii
 In more recent publications they use the concepts of cooperation and arm’s-length accommodation. 
Furthermore, avoidance (no negotiation) is added as a third option (Walton et al. 1994).  
iii
 The figures for Germany are, unlike the Danish figures, from a study that included both companies covered by 
collective agreements and companies not covered by collective agreements, and where companies with 5-50 
employees were defined as small. However, this can only to a limited extent contribute to the explanation of the 
difference in the coverage of Danish shop stewards and German works councils. 
iv
 In the following analysis we differentiate between small (20-49 employees), medium-sized (50-149 
employees) and large (150- employees) companies. This differs slightly from the definition of company sizes 
used in the analysis of the results of the phone survey, where companies are calculated as large beginning at 100 
employees or more (see Table 1). 
